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Abstract
We critically discuss John Roemer’s normative criterion of equal opportunity and
advance opportunity dominance as an alternative criterion for the evaluation of policies.
For Roemer, strict equality of opportunity obtains when people, irrespectively of circum-
stances beyond their control, have the same ability to achieve advantage through their
free choices. To implement this idea, Roemer sorts people with similar circumstances
into types and takes their free choices to be represented by their behaviour relative to
other members of the same type or, as Roemer calls it, by their ‘relative effort’. He
then proposes that society should maximize the average advantage of all those whose
circumstances cause them to be least well–off relative to others who have expended the
same degree of relative effort.
We argue that typing and the relative effort metric conflate the factors for which we do
and do not want to hold individuals responsible, whenever these factors are statistically
correlated. Moreover, Roemer’s rule for policy selection burdens the concept of equal
opportunity with foreign distributive principles. Pointing to an inconsistency in Roemer’s
argument, we also note that his selection rule violates his own requirement of Pareto–
optimality. In response to these difficulties, we advance the criterion of opportunity
dominance which is Pareto optimal, maintains conceptual purity and does not conflate
the factors for which individuals should and should not be held responsible. This criterion
determines a set of candidate policies that are undominated in opportunity and from
which a final policy must be selected by additional, conceptually distinct principles of
distributive justice.1
JEL classification numbers: D63
Key words: equality of opportunity, fairness
1The order of the authors is alphabetical and does not in any way reflect a difference in contribution
to this paper.
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1 Introduction
Equality of opportunity figures prominently in debates on the nature of a just society and
the achievement of some form of equal opportunity constitutes a professed goal of social
policy in most Western democracies. Nonetheless, the precise meaning of this concept
remains controversial. Conceptions of equality of opportunity range from the absence of
discrimination on the basis of race or gender to the elimination of the influence of social
background and natural differences on the attainment of advantage. In his pathbreaking
work, John Roemer has in recent years attempted to overcome this impasse. He has
advanced a precise definition of equality of opportunity and formulated an explicit rule
for the selection of equal–opportunity policies (Roemer 1993, 1996, 1998). His proposal
has been widely discussed and is being applied to the analysis of distributive issues in
schooling, health care, taxation and development aid (Roemer 1999, Llavador and Roe-
mer 2001). Despite of these achievements, we believe Roemer’s proposal to be seriously
flawed. This paper will present our main points of criticism, propose an alternative defi-
nition of equal opportunity and construct a selection mechanism that allows for a partial
ranking of opportunity policies.
Before we proceed with our discussion, we propose the following abstract definition
of equal opportunity. When we say that equality of opportunity with regard to a certain
advantage should obtain for a group of people, we mean that certain factors should and
other factors should not influence these people’s differential attainment of advantage. Let
us refer to the first set of factors as people’s ‘relevant characteristics’ and to the second
set of factors as their ‘irrelevant characteristics’. Strict equality of opportunity thus
obtains if differences in people’s irrelevant characteristics do not result in differences in
their attainment of advantage. To make this general concept concrete, we have to specify
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not only the advantage in question, but also which characteristics we regard as morally
relevant and irrelevant. It is in these specifications that disagreement among proponents
of various forms of equal opportunity arise. Suppose, for example, that we are concerned
with the advantage of life–time income and we wish to compensate people for those
differences in advantage that result from their parents’ wealth. Suppose furthermore that
we have a simple predictive model of life–time earnings in which individuals are described
by only three characteristics, namely years of schooling, low or high IQ and poor or rich
family background. Imagine we consider parental income as morally irrelevant, while we
come to consider IQ and years of schooling as morally relevant in this context. Strict
equality of opportunity then requires us to equalize the advantage of all individuals with
identical relevant characteristics, regardless of their irrelevant features. In our example,
this would mean the equalization of the attainment of advantage between poor and rich
individuals with the same amount of schooling and the same intelligence. If we, however,
regarded not only parental income but also IQ as morally irrelevant, we would reach
a different conclusion. Strict equality of opportunity would then obtain when only the
individuals’ amount of schooling, but not their intelligence or their parental income,
determines their attainment of advantage. Different specifications of advantage and of
relevant and irrelevant characteristics thus result in different normative conceptions of
equality of opportunity and their specification involves an inescapable value judgement.
Recently, several authors have proposed a particular choice of the morally relevant
and irrelevant characteristics (Arneson 1989, Cohen 1989). According to this concep-
tion, the characteristics of moral relevance are precisely those characteristics over which
people have control. By contrast, people’s circumstances and other factors beyond their
control (or ‘circumstances’ for short) should not be a source of differential levels of ad-
vantage. The motivating idea of this conception is that equality of opportunity demands
people to be equally able to achieve the same outcomes through their free choices, but
that inequalities of outcomes are permissible when caused only by differences in peo-
ple’s free choices. Proponents of this conception of equal opportunity must address two
crucial questions. Firstly, how do we determine when individuals, faced with different
circumstances, have made similar choices and therefore have a claim to be made equally
well–off? Secondly, which distributive mechanism can best compensate people for the ef-
fect of circumstances on their attainment of advantage? John Roemer’s work responds to
both of these questions and, in a nutshell, makes the following proposal. We are to select
some representation of what we regard as people’s circumstances as well as some measure
of people’s actual choices which Roemer calls ‘effort’. We then sort people with similar
circumstances into ‘types’. Since the expenditure of actual effort may be influenced by
circumstances, Roemer takes individuals’ free choices to be represented not by their ac-
tual effort, but by their effort relative to other members of their type. For Roemer, strict
equality of opportunity has been established when people in different types who expend
the same degree of relative effort receive the same advantage. For practical purposes, he
then proposes that society should choose a policy that maximizes the average advantage
of those whose circumstances cause them to be the worst–off at a given level of relative
effort (where the average is taken over all degrees of relative effort).
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We shall argue that Roemer’s proposal is irrecoverably flawed. In Section 2, we take
issue with Roemer’s representation of people’s relevant and irrelevant characteristics. We
show that typing and the relative effort metric conflate people’s relevant and irrelevant
characteristics in the presence of statistical correlations among these characteristics. By
contrast, the simple formulation of the equal–opportunity criterion with which we started
this paper suffers from no such flaw. Moreover, we note that Roemer’s measure of
relative effort can be a product of an individual’s circumstances just as much as absolute
effort. Roemer’s construction therefore falls short of its own ambition to create an inter-
personally comparable measure of individuals’ free choices.
In Section 3, we take issue with Roemer’s rule for selecting an equal–opportunity
policy. We argue his rule burdens the concept of equal opportunity with utilitarian and
desert-based distributive principles that are foreign to the idea of equal opportunity. In
our view, a criterion of equal opportunity should be purely concerned with compensat-
ing people for the effects of their irrelevant characteristics, and should steer clear of any
commitment to principles governing the outcomes that people achieve due to their rele-
vant characteristics. We also point to an internal inconsistency in Roemer’s policy rule
that arises from the fact that his rule violates his own requirement of Pareto–optimality.
In response to these problems, we advance a criterion of opportunity dominance which
maintains this conceptual purity and is Pareto optimal. This criterion selects a set of
candidate policies that are undominated in opportunity. If the set contains more than
one policy, further choices have to be made on the basis of additional, conceptually dis-
tinct, principles of distributive justice. We suggest that future research should explore
the combined effect of familiar distributive principles, such as utilitarian or desert–based
principles, and the criterion of opportunity dominance.
2 Choice and Circumstance
2.1 The relevance of circumstance
On Roemer’s view, attainment of equal opportunity requires a distributional mechanism
that compensates people for the influence of factors beyond their control, but allows dif-
ferential outcomes insofar as they result from differences in people’s free choices. Equating
morally relevant characteristics with the factors that are within a person’s control, this
conception aims to incorporate a particular ideal of responsibility for outcomes into egali-
tarian theory. According to this ideal, people should be held responsible for the outcomes
of exactly those choices that were free and unaffected by circumstances. Contemporary
discussions of the notion of responsibility for outcomes cast doubt on the validity of this
particular conception and emphasize that responsibility for outcomes does not have to
be congruent with the notion of personal control (cf. Hart and Honore´ 1959, Fleurbaey
1995, Scanlon 1998, chapter 6). In our opinion, the distinction between factors within
and factors beyond a person’s control may at best act as a guide in the determination of
moral relevance, but we must not expect the notion of moral relevance and of personal
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control always to coincide. Nevertheless, in what follows, we shall discuss the merits of
Roemer’s proposal on its own terms and accept the premise that people should be held
responsible exactly for the factors that are within their control.
Based on this premise, Roemer sets out to devise a method to determine what we
can consider to be people’s free choices and also to determine when individuals faced
with different circumstances have made similar choices. Roemer (1998, 8–9) conceives
of this distinction between choice and circumstance as involving two distinct questions.
Firstly, what kinds of factors, such as family background and natural talents, are beyond
a person’s control? Secondly, given these factors and their influence on people’s choices,
what part of their behaviour can we attribute to their free choices? Roemer remains
silent on the first question, leaving it to be decided by society through some political
process. Once society has decided what to regard as factors beyond a person’s control,
Roemer constructs a ‘typing’ of the individuals concerned. For any list of circumstances,
such as social class, parental income, race, natural talents etc., we are to divide society
into types according to individuals’ value of these factors, with people who have the
same values of these factors falling into the same type. A type may thus consist of all
individuals with sufficiently similar parental income or of all individuals with the same
IQ. By construction, individuals within the same type are considered to be in the same
circumstances and, thus, to have an equal ability to achieve advantage. Within each
type, therefore, people’s differential achievement is considered to be entirely due to the
different choices they made.
The challenge is, then, to isolate the effects of circumstances on the attainment of
advantage for people in different types. These effects can be either direct or indirect. If,
for example, income is the advantage in question, the children of wealthy parents typically
have an increased income directly through parental gifts or bequests. But circumstances
can also affect the attainment of advantage indirectly, via their influence on the choices
that people make. People’s actual choices are dependent on their beliefs, preferences,
the range of options open to them and on their deliberative process. All of these can be
significantly influenced by factors beyond a person’s control. Indirect influences of this
kind are notoriously difficult to address since they imply that people’s actual choices,
due to their dependence on uncontrollable circumstances, are inappropriate grounds for
assigning advantage. Roemer therefore proposes to ‘go behind’ people’s actual choices,
stripping them of the influence of circumstance to reveal their ‘real choices’ for which we
can properly hold them responsible.
Roemer asks us to choose some observable measure of people’s choices that is related
to the advantage in question and which he calls ‘effort’. He then ranks all individuals
within a type according to their actual expenditure of effort. This ranking then allows
Roemer to partition people within each type into quantiles of effort relative to their type.
A person i belongs to the pi–quantile of relative effort exactly if a fraction pi of the entire
population expends at most as much effort as i. For example, if a population is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 2 hours of work, then the person who works for one hour will
be at pi = 0.5 in the distribution of relative work. Roemer argues that this measure of
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type–relative effort reveals a person’s ‘real choices’, unaffected by circumstance. He thus
uses the metric of relative effort to compare the choices of people belonging to different
types and he considers people to have made the ‘same choice’ exactly if they occupy the
same position in the relative effort distribution of their respective types. In effect, Roemer
takes the individuals’ places in the relative effort distribution of their types to be their
only relevant characteristic and concludes that strict equality of opportunity obtains
when all people who expend the same degree of relative effort are equal in advantage
(Roemer 1998, 15–16).
2.2 Typing misrepresents circumstance
In this section, we argue that Roemer’s method of typing leads to a conflation of the
characteristics for which we do and do not want to hold individuals responsible when both
kinds of characteristics are statistically correlated with each other. Suppose, for example,
that we are concerned with health care insurance and that we wish to compensate people
for their exposure to a persuasive and misleading advertizing campaign for cigarettes.
Our example assumes that the cigarette manufactures targeted a particular subgroup of
the population and that exposure E and non–exposure E¯ to this campaign was beyond
the individuals’ control and is considered morally irrelevant. For simplicity’s sake, we
also assume that up to the start of the campaign people’s decision to smoke was the result
of an unimpeachable process of free choice. We therefore regard it as morally relevant
whether a person was a smoker S or non–smoker S¯ before the campaign. Following
Roemer’s methodology, we would now sort people into two types, the set tE of people
who were exposed to the campaign and the set tE¯ of people who were not. On Roemer’s
method, any difference between the smoking behaviour of these two types would be
attributed to the advertizing campaign and, consequently, would occasion a redistribution
of social endowments. Now, imagine that those individuals singled out by the cigarette
manufacturers for their advertizing campaign were exactly the individuals who did not
smoke before the campaign. Hence, the set of individuals with characteristic E and the
set of individuals with characteristic S¯ are identical. Imagine further that, although
the advertizing campaign was effective and increased the proportion of smokers in the
exposed type, people exposed to the campaign still tend to smoke less than members of
the unexposed type of long–term smokers.
In this example, Roemer’s method would treat the exposed type tE as if it were
advantaged and the non–exposed type tE¯ as if it were disadvantaged by circumstance.
To see this, suppose we had one person from each type, each smoking an equal amount
of cigarettes. Since the average cigarette consumption in the exposed type is lower than
in the non–exposed type, the person from the exposed type would be considered to have
tried less hard to resist smoking than the person from the non–exposed type. Translated
into a concrete policy, this might mean that the person from the exposed type would have
to pay more for the same package of health care insurance. This is contrary to reason
because, by assumption, both individuals had been unimpeachably free in their choices
up to the start of the advertizing campaign and we set out explicitly to compensate for
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differences arising from exposure to the advertizing campaign.
What this example shows is that Roemer’s typing methodology cannot deal with
correlation between factors for which we do and do not want to hold people responsible.
The difficulty with his proposal occurs only because his formalism represents irrelevant
characteristics, such as exposure to the advertizing campaign, by the set of individuals
who exhibit these characteristics. This method goes astray when there exists a statistical
correlation between relevant and irrelevant characteristics. In our example, we used an
extreme form of correlation in which relevant and irrelevant characteristics were exhibited
the very same set of individuals, but the same phenomenon also occurs of course for less
extreme forms of correlation.
To avoid this problem, we must not represent irrelevant characteristics indirectly by
the set of individuals who display these characteristics. Instead, once we are given the
characteristics that are used to describe the individuals and to predict their expected
outcome relative to our econometric model, we must sort these characteristics into a
set of morally relevant characteristics and a set of morally irrelevant characteristics.
Suppose that u(φ, y, z) is the (expected) outcome under policy φ of an individual with a
combination y of relevant characteristics and a combination z of irrelevant characteristics.
Strict equality of opportunity would then be achieved by a policy φ which, for any
combinations z and z′ of irrelevant characteristics, equalizes the functions u(φ, ., z) and
u(φ, ., z′):
u(φ, y, z) = u(φ, y, z′) (1)
for any combination y of relevant characteristics and any combinations z and z′ of
irrelevant characteristics. Our example used a simplistic econometric model in which
individuals are described by only two characteristics, namely the irrelevant characteristic
of exposure E or non–exposure E¯ and the relevant characteristic of voluntary smoking
S or non–smoking S¯ in the past. Strict equality of opportunity requires a policy φ
that, firstly, equalizes the outcome u(φ, S,E) and u(φ, S, E¯) of exposed and non–exposed
past smokers and, secondly, equalizes the advantage u(φ, S¯, E) and u(φ, S¯, E¯) of exposed
and non–exposed past non–smokers. (In our simple example of a perfectly targeted
advertizing campaign, this is an empty constraint since there do not exist any individuals
displaying both S and E or displaying both S¯ and E¯.) However, equal opportunity does
not require us to equalize the outcome u(φ, S¯, E) and u(φ, S, E¯) of exposed past non–
smokers and non–exposed past smokers. It is exactly this unwarranted compensation of
the differences in the opportunity of exposed past non–smokers and non–exposed past
smokers that is implied by Roemer’s method of typing and that is easily avoided by our
proposal.
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2.3 Relative effort is also a product of circumstance
As we discussed above, Roemer’s reason for representing irrelevant characteristics by the
set of individuals who display these characteristics is part of his method for comparing the
choices of people in different circumstances and for determining when people in different
circumstances are considered to have made the same choice. In our view, the problems
of the typing methodology that we rehearsed above already discredit the measure of
relative effort as the basis for assessing equality of opportunity. To return to the case
of the advertizing campaign, it would be a mistake to conclude that an exposed and an
unexposed individual who both smoke to the same degree relative to their own type are
entitled to the same outcome. If we accepted this conclusion, we would have to transfer
resources away from the very people whom we intended to compensate for their exposure
to the campaign.
On a more fundamental level, we will now argue that Roemer’s measure of relative
effort does not solve the problem it was designed to address. As we saw, Roemer suggests
that absolute effort is an unsuitable basis for assessing equality of opportunity because
“the distribution of effort is a characteristic of the type, and hence not something the
person should be held accountable for” (Roemer 1998, p. 11). Roemer’s suggestion of
moving to the metric of relative effort could only solve this problem if the distribution
of relative effort was not also influenced by factors beyond individuals’ control. As a
matter of fact, however, the distribution of relative effort is just as much a product of
circumstances beyond people’s control as the distribution of absolute effort. Individuals
base their choices to expend effort in part on the reward schedule for effort that is jointly
determined by their circumstances and the policy they face. By implication, different
circumstances and different policies therefore differentially affect an individual’s choice of
effort. Under a policy that results in different reward schedules for individuals in different
types, we therefore expect to see different distributions of absolute and relative effort for
different types. Moreover, individuals typically differ in their response to the very same
reward schedule due to different preferences for combinations of effort and reward. If
these responses are distributed differently across different types, we also expect to see
different distributions of absolute and relative effort for different types, irrespective of the
policy chosen. The distribution of relative effort therefore typically differs across types
just as much as that of absolute effort.
As an illustration, imagine a population from different ethnic backgrounds and a
policy maker who is interested in establishing equal opportunity for life–time income.
Since an important choice factor contributing to people’s income is their amount of
schooling, we may decide to use years of post–mandatory education as a measure of
effort and to sort people by types according to their ethnicity. Suppose that, some type I
exhibits a large range of different effort levels with its members equally distributed over
the levels of 1, 2, 3 and 4 years of post–mandatory education. We assume that types differ
in their educational choice because of a culture that discourages higher education in type
II. As a result, 75 percent of all members of type II pursue 1 year of additional education
while only 25 percent of all members of type II pursue 2 years. Clearly, in this case, the
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Figure 1: Distribution of absolute and relative effort
distribution of absolute effort is a characteristic of the type to which individuals belong.
The same holds true, however, for relative effort. To see this, consider the distribution of
relative effort. According to Roemer’s definition, an individual i expends relative effort
pi if and only if pi is the fraction of individuals of the type who expend a level of absolute
effort of at most the amount expended by i. Figure 1 shows that both the distribution
of absolute and the distribution of relative effort differ across type I and II.
Note that this simple example does not make any reference to the advantage received
by the individuals. For all we have said, a policy that equalizes opportunities between
the two types may already be in place, giving an equal life–time income to the individuals
in different types who are at the same position in the relative effort distribution of their
type. (In this example, this would mean that individuals in type II with 1 year of higher
education obtain the same life–time income as individuals in type I with 3 years of higher
education, and those individuals in type II who have 2 years of higher education obtain
the same life–time income as those in type I who have 4 years of higher education.) There
is hence no reason to suppose that the policy that equalizes opportunities between these
two groups will produce the same distribution of relative effort in each type. A type–
dependent variation of the distributions of both absolute and relative effort may occur
regardless of individuals’ advantage functions and regardless of whether or not these
advantage functions equalize opportunity. In sum, relative effort can be just as much a
product of circumstance as absolute effort and the appeal to relative effort therefore fails
to solve the problem that Roemer set out to resolve. Roemer’s construction therefore falls
short of its own ambition to create an inter-personally comparable measure of individuals’
free choices.
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2.4 Typing misrepresents relevance
For each type t, Roemer assumes the existence of a function ut = ut(φ, e) that yields
the (expected) advantage of an individual of this type depending on some relevant char-
acteristic e (the effort variable) and on policy φ. Since the individuals in a given type
share some, but not all of their personal characteristics, we cannot expect that they all
enjoy the same advantage at a given level of effort and under a given policy. Suppose, for
example, that we are interested in equal opportunity for life–time income among people
from different social backgrounds. Suppose we choose years of post–mandatory schooling
as our effort variable. We sort people into two types depending on whether they come
from a ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ family background. Within each type, these people will differ in
some additional characteristic, such as intensity of job–seeking activity, that influences
their expected life–time income at a given level of schooling. Thus, the assumption that
all individuals of a given type have the same function of advantage to effort will typically
be false. Roemer addresses this problem by constructing the function ut as the average
of the advantage functions of the individuals in type t (Roemer 1996, p. 280, Llavador






u(φ, e, xi), (2)
where It is the number of individuals in type t and xi represents the characteristics
of individual i other than the effort level e. In our example, this means that for any
given choice of years of post–mandatory schooling, the advantage function is constructed
by averaging the advantage attained by individuals with differing levels of job–seeking
activity.
This construction leads to a misrepresentation of the influence of irrelevant character-
istics when the effort variable is correlated with other relevant characteristics in different
ways in different types. The present problem is structurally similar to the one discussed
in section 2.2. The difference is that the present case does not involve correlations be-
tween relevant and irrelevant characteristics, but correlations within the set of relevant
characteristics. The problem can thus arise even when relevant characteristics are not
correlated with the characteristics used to define the type, as was the case in section 2.2.
This flaw can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose we have ten persons,
A through J, and the three characteristics of years of schooling, job–seeking activity,
and parental income. Suppose that these characteristics determine a person’s (expected)
life–time income under the status quo by the following formula: life–time income equals
1 for short schooling + 2 for long schooling + 0 for low job–seeking activity + 8 for high
job–seeking activity + 0 for low parental income + 1 for high parental income. Society
decides that parental income is an irrelevant characteristic and that years of schooling
is the pertinent effort variable. The example is illustrated numerically in the following
table.
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Individuals schooling job–seeking activity parental income advantage
A short (1) low (0) poor (0) 1
B short (1) high (8) poor (0) 9
C long (2) low (0) poor (0) 2
D long (2) high (8) poor (0) 10
E short (1) low (0) rich (1) 2
F short (1) low (0) rich (1) 2
G short (1) high (8) rich (1) 10
H long (2) low (0) rich (1) 3
I long (2) high (8) rich (1) 11
J long (2) high (8) rich (1) 11
Under Roemer’s approach, we would type according to parental income, with A–D
falling into the ‘poor’ type, and E–J falling into the ‘rich’ type. To assess this status
quo, we then construct an advantage function for each type by averaging the advantage
received at every effort level. For type ‘poor’, this means that at effort level 1, advantage
is 5, and at effort level 2 advantage is 6. For type ‘rich’, the numbers are 4.7 and
8.3 respectively. We then take the relative effort levels in each type and compare the
advantage obtained in each type in order to judge which individuals are ‘disadvantaged’.
The result is given in the following table.
Type relative effort advantage a la Roemer Roemer’s verdict
poor low (A&B) 5 ‘advantaged’
high (C&D) 6 ‘disadvantaged’
rich low (E&F&G) 4.7 ‘disadvantaged’
high (H& I &J) 8.3 ‘advantaged’
We can see that because the two relevant characteristics of relative effort and job–
seeking activity are correlated differently in the different types, Roemer’s method of
determining the advantage function of a type yields the wrong verdict on which individ-
uals are advantaged and which individuals are disadvantaged. For two individuals with
the same level of job–seeking activity and the same amount of schooling, the advantage
of the individual from a rich family is, by the assumptions of our example, one unit
higher than the advantage of the individual from a poor family. Hence, individuals from
rich families are advantaged in the status quo, regardless of their level of job–seeking
activity or years of schooling. Instead, Roemer’s method concludes that ‘low–effort rich’
individuals are at a disadvantaged vis–a`–vis ‘low–effort poor’ individuals. In addition, it
overestimates the degree to which ‘high-effort rich’ individuals are advantaged vis–a`–vis
‘high-effort poor’ individuals.
This example has been constructed in a such way that Roemer’s method does not
cause the problems that we discussed in section 2.2. For the relevant characteristics are
in the current example not correlated with the irrelevant characteristics used in typing.
Moreover, the assumption that we represent people’s choices by relative effort is not
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essential in this example. If, as a consequence of our earlier arguments, we replace
relative by absolute effort, the example goes through unchanged.
A defender of Roemer’s method could try to protest that we have not chosen the effort
variable appropriately if we consider not only years of schooling but also job–seeking
activity to be a morally relevant characteristic. This defender might argue that the effort
variable must consist of all possible combinations of morally relevant characteristics. In
our case, the effort variable would then consist of combinations of years of schooling and
levels of job–seeking activity. This defense might not be welcome to Roemer since his
method of calculation relative effort relies on some ranking of effort levels in the direction
of increasing effort. It is not clear how such a ranking should be constructed for a multi–
dimensional effort variable that is composed of several relevant characteristics. Does a
combination three years of schooling and high job–seeking activity represent a greater
effort than four years of schooling and low job–seeking activity?
Our earlier method for solving the problem of correlation between irrelevant and rele-
vant characteristics also avoids the current difficulties. Since the notion of typing plays no
role in our proposal, we do not require the construction of an aggregated advantage func-
tion for a type. Once characteristics have been sorted into relevant and irrelevant, strict
equality of opportunity simply demands that we equalize the advantage of all individuals
with the same relevant characteristics. This would correctly occasion a redistribution
of advantage from individuals with a rich family background to those from a poor fam-
ily background. The different ways in which this redistribution could take place is the
subject of the following sections, where we will return to this example.
3 Selecting an Equal–Opportunity Policy
3.1 Utilitarianism for the disadvantaged?
We now turn to Roemer’s method for selecting an equal–opportunity policy. It is impor-
tant to note at the outset that strict equality of opportunity leaves open one important
issue that must eventually be resolved if we wish to select a concrete policy. All that
equality of opportunity demands is that individuals who share the same relevant char-
acteristics should also receive the same outcome. This leaves open how much an equal–
opportunity policy should spend on individuals with different relevant characteristics.
Suppose in our previous example that we can carry out a redistribution without any loss
of resources through lump–sum transfers among individuals with different parental in-
come and/or effort levels. We could then achieve strict equality of opportunity by taxing
each rich individual by 0.4 units of life–time income and giving 0.6 units to each poor
individual. However, we could also achieve strict equality of opportunity by only taxing
the ‘short–schooling rich’ by 1 unit. This would trivially equalize the advantage of poor
and rich individuals with short schooling and we could then spend the as yet unused 3
units of advantage to equalize opportunity between poor and rich individuals with long
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schooling. There may thus exist many different ways to establish strict equality of op-
portunity. Any method for choosing an equal–opportunity policy must therefore answer
the question of how much of our budget we should spend on individuals with different
relevant characteristics. In this section, we will discuss how this budget problem arises in
the context of Roemer’s maximin approach and we will look at Roemer’s proposed solu-
tion to this problem. We will argue that criteria for solving the budget problem ought to
be kept separate from a criterion of equal opportunity. We would otherwise blur the line
between the concept of equal opportunity and other, conceptually distinct distributional
criteria, such as utilitarianism or some notion of reward according to effort.
For each type t, Roemer assumes the existence of a function ut = ut(φ, e) that yields
the (expected) advantage of an individual of this type depending on effort e and policy φ.
Given the distribution of absolute effort levels within a type, we can now determine an
individual’s relative level of effort pi within this type. Roemer then calculates the function
vt(φ, pi) that specifies the advantage of type t for the relative effort pi under policy φ. For
the sake of the argument, we will accept this construction in terms of relative effort in
spite of our arguments in the previous section. Whatever we say in the present section
applies unaltered if we replace relative effort by absolute effort or, indeed, by any other
characteristic of individuals that we might deem to be relevant.
Suppose that we have sorted the population of individuals into centiles of effort within
their type. Strict equality of opportunity would now require the choice of a policy φ within
the budget such that
vt(φ, pi) = vt′(φ, pi) for all pi = .01, . . . , .99, 1. (3)
Roemer approaches the problem of policy selection from the viewpoint of optimization
theory. The idea of optimization is to define a relation of betterness and then to pick
a policy that is best according to this relation. From this viewpoint, Roemer rehearses
two problems with strict equalization. Firstly, there may not exist any feasible policy
that achieves strict equalization. Secondly, strict equalization may lead to Pareto inferior
allocations in which it is possible to make some individual better–off without making any
individual worse–off. For these reasons (to which we will return below), Roemer replaces
the requirement of equalization by the demand that we maximize the advantage of the
type that is worst-off vis–a`–vis other types at the same relative effort level, i.e. that we
choose a policy φ that maximizes
min
t
vt(φ, pi) for all pi = .01, . . . , .99, 1. (4)
Roemer correctly points out that this is not a well–defined optimization problem
unless we are given a budget constraint for each level of relative effort. Such a constraint
must tell us how much of our budget we should spend on highly motivated individuals
who expend a high amount of relative effort and how much we should spend on less
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motivated individuals who expend a lower amount of relative effort. Roemer’s solution
to the budget problem gives each of the 100 centiles equal weight in determining the













Roemer’s criterion offers a mixture of maximin and utilitarian reasoning by requiring
us to maximize the average, taken over all centiles of relative effort, of the advantage
enjoyed by the least well–off type at that centile. The maximin element in Roemer’s
criterion determines the advantage of the least well–off type at any level of relative effort.
Note that different types may be least well–off at different centiles of relative effort. In
the example from section 2.4, for instance, Roemer’s methodology considered the rich
type to be at a disadvantage for the first fifty centiles of relative effort, while the poor
type was considered to be at a disadvantage for the second fifty centiles. The utilitarian
element in Roemer’s criterion then trades off the least advantage achieved at low levels of
relative effort against the least advantage achieved at high levels of relative effort. It will
therefore mandate a worsening of the situation for disadvantaged individuals with low
levels of relative effort in exchange for an improvement in the situation of disadvantaged
individuals at high levels of relative effort, if this increases the average least advantage
across different centiles.
Needless to say, this solution to the budget problem has a plethora of competitors.
Other criteria that appear equally defensible could recommend spending an equal portion
of the overall budget on each combination of relevant characteristics (equal split between
characteristics), spending a portion of the overall budget on each combination of relevant
characteristics y that corresponds to the number of individuals with the combination y
(a form of equal split weighted by the amount of individuals), or allocating the budget
so as to maximize the advantage attained by those whose characteristics lead to the
lowest absolute level of advantage (a form of leximinism). An additional constraint that
Roemer (1993, 160; 1998, 104n26) himself occasionally advocates is based on a notion of
desert and requires that individuals who expend a higher degree of relative effort should
also attain a higher level of advantage. It should be clear that any of these criteria
are conceptually distinct from the notion of equal opportunity. These criteria pertain
to the advantage that individuals ought to receive on the basis of their morally relevant
characteristics, while the notion of equal opportunity is concerned with the compensation
of individuals for disadvantages that arise from their irrelevant characteristics. We would
therefore like to see a formulation of a selection criterion that clearly sets such criteria
apart from the concern for equal opportunity. We take up the task of formulating such
a criterion in section 3.3, after clearing up a final inconsistency in Roemer’s approach in
the following paragraphs.
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3.2 Equality, Maximin and Leximin
Before we turn to a new formulation of the equal–opportunity criterion, we note an
inconsistency in Roemer’s argument. Recall that Roemer abandoned strict equality (3)
in favour of maximin (4) partly for reasons of Pareto–optimality. We start from the trivial
observation that the argument for maximin based on Pareto optimality does not achieve
its full purpose. Maximin recommends itself over equalization because it allows Pareto
improvements of the egalitarian allocation. However, maximinism does not exploit all
Pareto improvements that are possible. Consider a simple example in which, under a
policy φ, black men and women enjoy an equal advantage that is lower than that of
either white women or white men. Suppose that φ maximizes the advantage of the least
well–off types, namely black men and black women. For simplicity, we may assume
that this ordering holds for any level of relative effort. This policy may still be Pareto
suboptimal if it is possible to find a policy ψ that increases the advantage of white women
without decreasing the advantage of black men and women. This example illustrates
the well–known fact that only the extension of maximin to leximin guarantees Pareto
optimality (Sen 1970). Adapted to our context, the leximin rule conditional on level
pi = .01, . . . , .99, 1 of relative effort reads:
(6) Maximize the advantage of the worst–off type at relative effort pi. In case of a tie,
maximize the advantage of the second worst–off type at relative effort pi. Proceed
analogously for all types.
Leximinism not only provides a choice rule for an optimal policy, but it also allows us
to compare different policies relative to each other. According to leximin, a policy φ is
at least as good as a policy ψ conditional on a level pi of relative effort exactly when the
advantage of the worst–off type under policy φ at relative effort pi is at least as great as
the advantage of the worst–off type under ψ at pi and, in case of a tie, the advantage of
the second worst–off type under φ at pi is at least as great as the advantage of the second
worst–off type under ψ at pi etc. Note that this definition is relative to the parameter
pi and the budget question reviewed in the pervious section is how we should treat this
loose parameter in the suggested optimization problem.
At this point, an inconsistency arises in Roemer’s argument. The argument based
on Pareto optimality leads to leximin rather than maximin, but Roemer’s treatment of
the loose parameter pi applies only to maximin and cannot possibly apply to leximin.
When Roemer addresses the loose parameter pi in the case of maximin, he suggests as
a solution that we sum the values of the expression mint vt(φ, pi) over all possible levels
pi = .01, . . . , .99, 1. This treatment presupposes that the expressions over which the sum
is taken yields a number, for otherwise the operation of summing is not defined. The
minimum operator, of course, always yields a number; leximin, however, never yields a
number. Leximin generates only an ordering of policies, but not a numerical measure
of the amount by which one policy is better than another policy. Hence, the suggested
treatment of the free parameter pi does carry over from maximin to the case of leximin.
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3.3 Opportunity dominance
Although there are disputes about the characteristics for which individuals deserve com-
pensation, some form of equal opportunity is one of the few social goals in the current
political discussion that find common support from opposing political ideologies. Po-
litical arguments therefore frequently appeal to equal opportunity as a principle that is
thought to mitigate disagreements about how to compensate individuals for differences
in outcomes. In this political context, it is important to keep our equal–opportunity cri-
terion free from controversial assumptions about reward and compensation for outcomes.
Only if this neutrality is preserved, can we explore by how much the satisfaction of
some equal–opportunity constraint arbitrates the import of controversial compensatory
principles, such as outcome–utilitarianism and outcome–leximinism. Generally speaking,
our task is therefore to define a criterion that evaluates policies depending on how they
compensate individuals for their irrelevant characteristics and yet remains neutral on the
question of how we should distribute reward to individuals with different combinations
of relevant characteristics.
With this purpose in mind, we recast the idea of the previous paragraphs in our
preferred framework. Suppose we have a predictive model for the (expected) advantage
that results from different combinations of individual characteristics. Suppose, further-
more, that society has sorted these characteristics into those that are morally relevant
and those that are morally irrelevant. We could now apply the narrow criterion (1) of
strict equality of opportunity that we formulated in section 2.2. For the purpose of policy
selection, Roemer already raised two of the most common objections against this strict
requirement. He pointed out that, on the one hand, there may not exist any policy that
achieves strict equalization, while, on the other hand, equalizing policies may not be
Pareto optimal. Although Pareto–optimality is itself not an intrinsic part of the con-
cept of equality (Sugden 1984, Cohen 2000), it seems to be almost universally regarded
as a desirable property of rules for policy selection. We will therefore use the leximin
principle from the previous section to define when one policy compensates for irrelevant
characteristics better than another policy, conditional on some combination of relevant
characteristics. In a second step, we will then construct a partial ranking of possible
policies on the basis of these conditional comparisons.
A policy φ is at least as good as a policy ψ conditional on relevant characteristics
y exactly when φ leads to at least as great an advantage as ψ for individuals with the
relevant characteristics y and the worst possible irrelevant characteristics z and, in case
of a tie, φ leads to at least as great an advantage as ψ for individuals with relevant
characteristics y and the second–worst irrelevant characteristics z′ etc. A policy φ is
better than a policy ψ conditional on relevant characteristics y exactly when φ is at
least as good as ψ conditional on y and, moreover, for individuals with the relevant
characteristics y and some irrelevant characteristics z
′′
, φ leads to a greater advantage
than ψ. We noted above that it is not clear how these conditional orderings could be
synthesized into an overall, unconditional ordering. The desire for such a synthesized
ordering resulted from Roemer’s optimization approach that seeks to define a relation of
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unconditional betterness and then to pick a policy that is best according to this relation.
Abandoning this idea, we merely synthesize a partial ranking of the available policies.
We will therefore not be able to use this ranking to pick some best policy but only to
dis-select dominated policies.
To make such partial comparisons, we consider whether or not a policy is better than
another conditional on any combination of relevant characteristics. We say that a policy
φ dominates in opportunity a policy ψ if and only if, for every combination of relevant
characteristics y, φ is at least as good as ψ conditional on y and, for some combination of
relevant characteristics y′, φ is better than ψ conditional on y′. The allocations between
which this criterion remains undecided are precisely those for which a budget decision has
to be made. Suppose that φ and ψ are both undominated in opportunity. In particular,
φ and ψ must then not dominate each other in opportunity. On the one hand, there
must hence be some of characteristics y such that φ leads to a greater advantage than ψ
for the worst irrelevant characteristics z (or, in case of a tie, the second–worst irrelevant
characteristics etc.). On the other hand, there must also be some relevant characteristics
y′ such that ψ leads to a greater advantage than φ for the worst irrelevant characteristics
z′ (or, in case of a tie, the second–worst irrelevant characteristics etc.). We now need to
decide whether to weigh the concerns of individuals with relevant characteristics y higher
than those with relevant characteristic y′ and to choose φ rather than ψ. This is exactly
the budget problem from above.
To apply the notion of opportunity dominance, we start from the set of feasible
policies. The feasibility of a policy will be determined by the overall available budget,
the implementability of the policy and similar practical considerations. In a second step,
we eliminate all policies from this set that are dominated in opportunity. The remaining
policies are then considered as the final candidates for an opportunity policy, requiring
a budgetary choice to be made. We note that the set of policies that are undominated
in opportunity is never empty (for any finite set of feasible policies). Moreover, the set
of candidate policies is Pareto optimal in the sense that for any of the candidate policies
there is no other feasible policy that could make some combination of characteristics
better off without making any other combination of characteristics worse off.
We apply this idea to the example of section 2.4 where life–time income under the
status quo was determined by the following formula: life–time income equals 1 for short
schooling + 2 for long schooling + 0 for low job–seeking activity + 8 for high job–seeking
activity + 0 for low parental income + 1 for high parental income. Suppose society
again regards parental income is an irrelevant characteristic and years of schooling and
job–seeking activity as relevant characteristics. Suppose first that our feasible policy
instruments allow us without any costs to redistribute life–time income depending on
irrelevant characteristics. We may thus allocate a lump sum transfer to individuals from
a poor family background. Any such lump sum that is given to the four poor individuals
must be paid for by the six rich individuals. The opportunity–dominance criterion then
eliminates all but one policy that is undominated in opportunity. An easy calculation
shows that this policy gives a lump sum transfer of 0.6 units of income to individuals
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with low parental income. Hence, each individual with high parental income is required
to pay 0.4 units of income and thus keeps 1− 0.4 = 0.6 units of income.
In general, the set of policies that are undominated in opportunity may contain more
than one element and we thus may again encounter the budget problem. Suppose, in
the previous example, that the set of feasible policies allows us without any costs to
redistribute life–time income depending not only on parental income, but also on years
of schooling. Going to extremes, we may then decide to collect the one additional unit
of advantage from all three rich individuals with short schooling. This would equalize
the advantage of poor and rich individuals with short schooling. We could then draw
on these additional three units when equalizing the opportunity between poor and rich
individuals with long schooling. Our first undominated policy would then allocate a
lump sum transfer of 1.2 units of advantage to poor individuals with long schooling.
This leaves an additional 0.2 units and hence a total of 1.2 units of advantage for rich
individuals with long schooling. We could also go to the opposite extreme and collect the
one additional unit of advantage from all three rich individuals with long schooling. This
would now equalize the advantage of poor and rich individuals with long schooling. Our
second undominated policy would then give 1.2 units of advantage to poor individuals
with short schooling. This again leaves an additional 0.2 units and hence a total of 1.2
units of advantage for rich individuals with short schooling.
Given this primary constraint of opportunity dominance, we may now vary the com-
pensatory principle by which we select a particular undominated policy according to
its outcomes. As we vary this compensatory principle from outcome–utilitarianism to
outcome–leximinism and other distributive criteria, we will be able determine the mag-
nitude of the remaining disagreement about the compensation for differential outcomes.
Our hope would be that, at least in some important cases, the appeal to opportunity
dominance will restrict the range of eligible policies sufficiently to marginalize the in-
fluence of these disagreements. Consider, for instance, the common objection against
utilitarianism that it is insensitive to inequalities of outcomes. This objection may be-
come less telling if the utilitarian outcome–criterion is subordinated to a selection from
the set of policies that are undominated in opportunity. In the same vein, we should ex-
plore the effect of other constraints, such as the common requirement that greater effort
should be rewarded by greater advantage. Roemer, for instance, suggests to constrain
the selection to those policies that yield a positive reward to effort in each type (Roemer
1993, 160; 1998, 104n26). In our example, the decision that longer schooling should lead
to a higher life–time income would exclude the second of the above policies. Nonetheless,
we would still have to decide by how much life–time income should increase with longer
schooling.
4 Conclusion
We conclude with a summary of our constructive suggestions. In sections 1 and 2,
we argued that every concrete application of the idea of equal opportunity involves an
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inescapable value judgement about which characteristics we consider relevant and irrel-
evant. We suggested that the distinction between factors within and factors beyond a
person’s control may act as a guide in the determination of moral relevance, but that we
must not expect the notions of relevance and of personal control to coincide. Depending
on the application and the advantage in question, relevant characteristics may involve
people’s natural or developed talents, people’s actual choices, or some notion which might
approximate Roemer’s idea of relative effort. Any concrete application of the idea of equal
opportunity therefore starts from a value judgement that classifies the characteristics by
which we describe the individuals and predict their expected advantage. Individuals will
then be held responsible for what are considered relevant characteristics, but not for
characteristics that are considered morally irrelevant.
In section 3, we argued that a criterion of equal opportunity should steer clear of
any controversial assumptions about how individuals should be rewarded for differences
in outcomes due to their relevant characteristics. Any such commitment would further
compromise the ability of a concrete principle of equal opportunity to muster support
from a wide spectrum of political ideologies. We have therefore proposed a formulation
that keeps the opportunity criterion conceptually distinct from principles governing the
compensation for relevant characteristics. In this formulation, we are able to vary the
criterion for the compensation of outcomes and gauge the magnitude of the disagreements
that remain in the presence of an opportunity criterion. This strategy enables the political
debate to be conducted on two distinct issues. Firstly, which factors should be considered
irrelevant for certain social advantages? Secondly, on what basis do we choose from
the set of feasible policies that are not dominated in opportunity? We hope that this
improved focus can help to settle political disagreements surrounding the implementation
of opportunity policies.
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